AWS ConsoleLogin with MFA triggered Impossible Travel scenario
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Goal
Detect an Impossible Travel event when a @userIdentity.type: {{@userIdentity.type}} performs a consoleLogin with a multi-factor authentication (MFA) device.
Strategy
The Impossible Travel detection type’s algorithm compares the GeoIP data of the last log and the current log to determine if the user with @userIdentity.session_name: {{@userIdentity.session_name}} traveled more than 500km at over 1,000km/h and the user used MFA.
Triage and response
- Determine if
{{@userIdentity.session_name}} should be connecting from {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.first_location.city}}, {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.first_location.country}} and {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.second_location.city}}, {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.second_location.country}} in a short period of time. - If the user should not be connecting from
{{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.first_location.city}}, {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.first_location.country}} and {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.second_location.city}}, {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.second_location.country}}, then consider isolating the account and reset credentials. - Use the Cloud SIEM - User Investigation dashboard to audit any user actions that may have occurred after the illegitimate login.
Changelog
- 10 March 2022 - Updated rule.
- 15 December 2022 - Updated rule to cover edge case.
- 30 September 2024 - Updated query to replace attribute
@threat_intel.results.subcategory:anonymizer.
