Classification:

attack

Tactic:

TA0001-initial-access

Technique:

T1078-valid-accounts

VIEW RULE IN DATADOG VIEW SIGNALS

Goal

Detect an Impossible Travel event when a @userIdentity.type: {{@userIdentity.type}} performs a consoleLogin without a multi-factor authentication (MFA) device.

Strategy

The Impossible Travel detection type’s algorithm compares the GeoIP data of the last log and the current log to determine if the user with @userIdentity.session_name: {{@userIdentity.session_name}} traveled more than 500km at over 1,000km/h and the account does not have MFA enabled.

Triage and response

1. Determine if {{@userIdentity.session_name}} should be connecting from {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.first_location.city}}, {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.first_location.country}} and {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.second_location.city}}, {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.second_location.country}} in a short period of time.
2. If the user should not be connecting from {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.first_location.city}}, {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.first_location.country}} and {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.second_location.city}}, {{@impossible_travel.triggering_locations.second_location.country}}, then consider isolating the account and reset credentials.
3. Use the Cloud SIEM - User Investigation dashboard to audit any user actions that may have occurred after the illegitimate login.

Changelog

• 30 September 2024 - Updated query to replace attribute @threat_intel.results.subcategory:anonymizer.